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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation explores the challenges that lead to underutilisation of
welfare products and policies in credit and health, among the poor in developing
countries. The essays in the area of Applied Microeconomics included herein shed
light on whether resources in welfare policies for the poor are channelised along 
the right path, and if not, how they could be improved.
The first essay studies take-up issues of microcredit loans. In a decision-
making experiment in the laboratory, I find that the take-up increases when
prospective borrowers are offered a flexible choice between joint and individual
liability loans. Results suggest that more risk-averse borrowers are less willing to
take up individual liability loan, and less selfish borrowers are more inclined to
take up joint liability loan. The results collectively imply that microloan contracts
must be designed according to heterogeneous preferences of borrowers in order to
increase take-up; furthermore, there should be enough flexibility in the offered
choice-set that leads to better self-selection.
In the second essay, I conduct an empirical investigation of Ugandan
households and find that while facing a negative income shock or an adverse health
shock, poor households are more prone to take their children for immunisation. The
findings highlight that adults in low-income households engage more in their
children’s preventive healthcare when the opportunity cost of being away from
work is low. Therefore, concerning policy, either price subsidies to offset the
opportunity cost or strict mandates on healthcare practices are necessary.
The final essay investigates the role of demand-side incentives to mothers and
supply-side incentives to community health workers (ASHAs) in improving
maternal and child health, in a nationwide health intervention in India. The
programme entitled socio-economically backward mothers with cash assistance if
they chose to give birth at public health institutions, and simultaneously employed
ASHAs to act as a direct link between a pregnant woman and the public healthcare
delivery system. Eligible mothers with both cash transfer and ASHA’s guidance
outperformed the eligible mothers receiving only cash transfer in various maternal
and neonatal outcomes. This validates that direct monetary incentives to the mother
can improve her uptake of maternal healthcare. Nevertheless, the stronger effect of
the ASHA’s presence ascertains that information on the importance of health and 
healthcare can bridge the gap to the low use of healthcare by the poor and that it
can be effectively addressed by incentivising the supply-side.
KEYWORDS: Development policy, take-up, microcredit, household shocks, 
preventive healthcare, time allocation, conditional cash transfer, maternal health, 
child health
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Tämä väitöskirja tutkii kehittyvissä maissa asuvien köyhien kohtaamia haasteita,
jotka johtavat hyvinvointipolitiikan ja -tuotteiden puutteelliseen hyödyntämiseen.
Väitöskirja sisältää johdantokappaleen sekä kolme esseetä soveltavan mikrotalous-
tieteen alalta. Jokaisen esseen kohdalla tarkastellaan sitä, ohjautuvatko köyhiin
kohdistetut hyvinvointipolitiikat oikein, ja jos eivät, miten hyvinvointipolitiikkaa
voitaisiin tehdä paremmin.
Ensimmäinen essee käsittelee mikroluottojen puutteellista hyödyntämistä. Pää-
töksentekoa tarkastelevan laboratoriokokeen tulosten mukaan luottoja hyödynne-
tään enemmän, mikäli lainanottajille tarjotaan mahdollisuus valita joustavasti
yhteis- tai yksilövastuullinen laina. Riskiä karttavat lainanottajat ovat haluttomam-
pia ottamaan lainan, josta he ovat yksin vastuussa. Lisäksi itsekkäämmät lainan-
ottajat välttävät ottamasta lainoja, joista he ovat vastuussa yhdessä muiden kanssa.
Nämä tulokset yhdessä tarkoittavat, että mikroluottosopimukset tulisi suunnitella
huomioimalla lainanottajien yksilölliset preferenssit, jotta niiden hyödyntäminen
kasvaisi. Lisäksi tarjotuissa lainoissa tulisi olla riittävästi joustavuutta, joka johtaisi
parempaan itsevalikoitumiseen.
Toinen essee käsittelee sitä, miten köyhät ugandalaiset kotitaloudet investoivat
ennaltaehkäisevään terveydenhuoltoon kohdatessaan yksilökohtaisia shokkeja. Tulos-
ten mukaan vanhemmat vievät lapsensa rokotettavaksi todennäköisemmin, mikäli
kotitalous kohtaa negatiivisen tulo- tai terveysshokin. Löydökset korostavat sitä, että
matalatuloiset kotitaloudet käyttävät enemmän aikaa lasten ennaltaehkäisevään
terveydenhuoltoon, kun työstä poissaolon vaihtoehtoiskustannus on matala. Politiikan 
kannalta hintoihin kohdistuvat tuet vaihtoehtokustannuksen tasoittamiseksi tai tiukka
sääntely terveydenhuoltoon liittyen näyttäisi olevan välttämätöntä.
Viimeinen essee käsittelee kysyntäpuolelle (äidit) ja tarjontapuolelle (terveyden-
hoitajat) kohdistettujen kannustimien vaikutuksia äitien ja lasten terveyteen. Intiassa
tehty terveydenhuoltoreformi tarjosi huonossa sosioekonomisessa asemassa oleville
äideille rahallista avustusta, mikäli he päättivät synnyttää julkisessa terveydenhuolto-
laitoksessa. Samanaikaisesti palkattiin terveydenhoitajia ohjaamaan äitejä synnyttä-
mään julkisen terveydenhuollon palveluita hyödyntäen. Ne äidit, jotka avustusten 
lisäksi saivat ohjausta terveydenhoitajilta, pärjäsivät paremmin useilla mittareilla.
Äideille kohdennetut suorat rahalliset kannusteet voivat siis lisätä äideille suunnattujen
terveydenhuoltopalveluiden käyttöä. Tämän lisäksi informaatiolla voidaan todeta
olevan tärkeä rooli, sillä terveydenhoitajien läsnäollessa reformin vaikutukset
voimistuivat, eli informaatio voi lisätä köyhien terveyspalveluiden käyttöä. Infor-
maatiota voidaan myös lisätä tehokkaasti tarjontapuolen kannusteilla. 
ASIASANAT: Kehittämispolitiikka, palveluiden hyödyntäminen, mikroluotto,
kotitalouden shokit, ennaltaehkäisevä terveydenhuolto, ajankäyttö, ehdollisen 
rahansiirron järjestelmät, äitien terveys, lasten terveys
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The combined wealth of the 26 richest people in the world was the same as the
combined wealth of the world’s poorest 3.8 billion people in 2018.1 Since the 2008
financial crisis, the wealth of the billionaires has grown by 12%, whereas over the
same period, the wealth of the world’s 3.8 billion poorest people declined by 11%.
According to the World Bank’s most recent estimates in 2015, 10% of the world’s
population, that is, about 734 million people were living on less than $ 1.90 per day
during that time. Although this number has gone down by 26 percentage points
since 1990, the share of the poor according to the multidimensional2 definition that
includes consumption, education, health and access to basic amenities, is about
50% higher than what the monetary poverty threshold states. For example, in Sub-
Saharan Africa, over one-fifth of children between ages 6-11 years are out of
school, followed by one-third of youth between the ages of 12-14 years. These are
the highest rates for education exclusion in the world.3 In terms of health, Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia still have the neonatal mortality rates at least over
25, child mortality (5-14 years) being the highest in the former.4 
1 Source: Oxfam Report in World Economic Forum, 2019
2 The move from unidimensional to multidimensional concept of poverty evolved as the
approaches such as basic needs (as opposed to the increase in income), social 
exclusion and Amartya Sen’s capability approach, together called for understanding
the actual satisfaction of basic needs. In contrast to the income method of measuring
poverty, Sen advocated the ‘direct method’ of poverty identification, which assesses
human deprivation in terms of shortfalls from minimum levels of basic needs per se. 
The reasoning for this being - while an increase in purchasing power allows the poor
to achieve their basic needs better, markets for all basic needs may not always exist.
Alongside, empirical findings that income does not correctly proxy non-monetary
deprivations for identifying the poor, have ushered in the importance of having
multidimensional measures of poverty (Sen, 1981; Alkire et al., 2015).
3 Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2020
4 Source: United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation
(UNIGME), 2019
11 
 
  
  
        
  
     
          
           
         
          
  
   
     
   
    
     
   
     
      
   
  
     
           
    
 
           
        
   
   
  
 
  
          
   
 
   
 
Susmita Baulia
Even more unsettling than the sheer population size below the monetary
poverty line and in all-round deprivation, is that these people do not have the tools 
to climb out of poverty by themselves. However, what is inspiring is that, with an 
external positive push, they do stand a chance to do better. Although much has
been done in the past few decades by the policy-makers and researchers
worldwide, to help them out of poverty through various welfare policies, the goal is
still quite far from achieved. Some welfare policies work, many fail. So the question 
that arises here is that are we doing enough to fight the issue? Or, is it so that the
resources are not being channelised in the right path? This dissertation aims to
delve into the latter question.
The take-up of new products and services lies where demand and supply meet.
Individuals decide on whether to borrow money, open a savings account or buy 
health insurance based on their needs and preferences, as well as the products and
services offered (Karlan et al., 2010). Often the take-up of a particular policy is low 
because various intrinsic costs exceed its benefits. This dissertation lies at the crux
of that issue for the poor. Through the three essays in this dissertation, I explore the
challenges that often lead to sub-optimal take-up or underutilisation of welfare
products and policies among the poor. While the first two essays investigate some
facets of the demand-side challenges, the third essay also highlights a supply-side
challenge in parallel. The first essay concerns the take-up of microcredit loans,
which has been a prominent credit policy for the poor in developing countries; the
next two essays are about the take-up of healthcare.
In this introductory section, I present an overview of the states of credit and 
health in developing countries and the response of the poor towards some related
policies. Then, I discuss what the existing literature says on the utilisation of those 
policies. In Section 2, I summarise the three essays, present their results and
discuss their contributions to the existing literature.
1.2 Credit and Health in Developing Countries
While the need for credit can be considered as the means in the resource-
constrained poor households, health can be regarded as the end. Therefore, ideally,
if the means are addressed, they should trickle down to the end. However, it is not
easy arithmetic. Research shows that while microcredit only has moderate effects
that often do not go beyond business creation for a short term, health investment
also does not come that easy for the poor, not at least in their long-term decision-
making.
12
 
 
  
    
  
 
 
    
        
            
          
      
   
  
          
     
 
         
  
     
     
     
  
     
              
            
     
              
            
        
   
       
       
       
      
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
Introduction
1.2.1 Credit
In this subsection, I discuss the evolution of microfinance in the past few decades.
Although different welfare policies on financing the poor have been used in the
policy frontier, microfinance is the primary one so far. In what follows, is a review
of it.
With the help of financial products such as loans, savings and insurances,
individuals can allocate consumption efficiently. However, the absence of functional 
financial markets for the poor is an obstacle. While in a traditional loan contract, a
borrower uses collateral, a poor individual hardly has such resources. Thus,
uncollateralised loans to the poor put the burden of loss on the lender in case of
defaults, and furthermore, the interest revenue from small loans is not enough to 
compensate for the costs spent on screening, monitoring and enforcement.
Consequently, the poor are pushed into a vicious cycle of poverty and have little
chance to smooth the income shocks that they otherwise face frequently. Here
came in the revolutionary concept of microfinance to help the “unbanked”, initiated
by Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh, who later won the Nobel Prize for Peace for
his work.
The concept of microfinance was pioneered by Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank in 
the ’80s. Within the framework of microfinance, small loans, also called
microcredit loans, were given out to the poor.5 The main objective of these loans 
was to help the small and informal firms to expand their businesses.
An innovative feature used in microcredit was the joint liability in repayment, by
which loans were given to poor borrowers in groups, and the latter were jointly liable
for the repayment. This liability structure implied that if one failed to repay, the other
members in the group had to pay on behalf of the defaulter. In this way, it reduced
the risk of loss due to default for the lending institutions. Through the joint liability
mechanism, the borrowers did not necessarily have to provide any collateral, and it
incentivised the borrowers in the group to monitor each other against any moral
hazard and free-riding issues. The joint liability structure joined with a fixed
repayment schedule with frequent instalments, and a dynamic incentive (whereby the
incentive to repay is generated by the promise of access to future loans), gained an 
impetus around the world in the ’90s. Following the successful footsteps of the
Grameen Bank, a flourishing microfinance industry emerged across the developing
countries, following the Grameen format. In the frontline of that industry were,
BancoSol and ACCION in South America, ADIE in Europe and the Mediterranean 
Microfinance means the broad spectrum of financial services such as loans, insurance,
savings provided to the people of low-income groups. However, microcredit implies a
small loan provided at a low interest rate, to the poor to make them self-employed, i.e.
to help the small entrepreneurs start their businesses.
5 
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Basin and a dozen MFIs in India. By 2003, the number of borrowers was about
120,000 with a gross loan portfolio of 30 million dollars in Asia, 21,000 borrowers
with 22 million dollars portfolio in Latin America and the Caribbean (Helms, 2006).
In theoretical economics research, various mechanisms of the joint liability
gained prominence (e.g. peer screening (Ghatak, 1999), peer monitoring (Stiglitz,
1990) and peer enforcement (Besley and Coate, 1995). The general idea of all
these models was to shift the burden of default from the lender to a borrowing
group that would give them the incentive to use local information and social ties for
ensuring repayment. Although this structure helped in the expansion of loan
markets in the developing countries, empirical evidence on which theoretical
mechanism actually works is relatively thin. In addition to that, field studies that
have directly compared default rates and repayment rates in joint liability structure
vis-à-vis the conventional individual liability structure, have not necessarily found
any significant difference (Giné and Karlan, 2014).
Moreover, when it comes to the general impact of microcredit loans, empirical
evidence shows only a moderate effect. For example, Banerjee et al. (2015b)
summarise from six large-scale studies across different countries that the effects of
these loans neither spill over on consumption (not just in the short run, but also in
the long run) nor on human capital investment, beyond some business creation.
However, another side observation comes up in all these studies, and that is the
low take-up of these credit products. To give some perspective, one of the first field
studies in the urban slums of India found that take-up after a study-period of three
years was only nine percentage points more among the householdsthat were offered
loans in comparison to those who were not (the general take-up rate being 33% in
control areas). Moreover, no significant difference in business creation was seen in
the treatment and control areas (Banerjee et al., 2015a).
Since the starting point of my research on microcredit is from these consistent
findings on low take-up, I discuss in detail in the following subsection, the various
insights that recent literature has offered on this issue.
1.2.2 Why the low take-up of credit?
In the body of work on take-up of microcredit, some patterns stand out. The
reasons for the low take-up can be broadly classified through the following 
channels – (a) insufficient information on availability, (b) constraints to
entrepreneurial ability, and (c) lack of demand-driven product design.6 
Note, here I discuss the take-up of loans only. The take-up of other microfinance
products, such as insurance, could be affected by another channel, such as liquidity
constraint (Cole et al., 2013).
6 
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Introduction
Targeting the poorest of the poor with microfinance products is the most difficult
challenge, and this could be partially due to the significant information gap that 
exists between potential borrowers and lending institutions. Johnston and Morduch 
(2008) find in the Indonesian context that a large share of creditworthy borrowers is 
devoid of any loan. To bridge the gap to financial use, dissemination of information
through marketing drives is crucial. In addition, on-site assessment of the potential
borrowers by the lending institution personnel can reduce information asymmetry
by a large extent. However, in reality, the problem lies in the fact that these
borrowers bring so limited profit potential through these small loan amounts, that
the banks find it too costly to introduce these additional marketing drives. Thus, the
absence of information and marketing on credit products is one of the critical 
reasons that reduce take-up by the target groups.  Cole et al. (2013) provide
evidence from rural villages in India that receiving a product flyer or getting a visit
from a finance educator can significantly increase the take-up rate of credit
products. Finally, the passing of information through village networks about
existent microloan programmes has also been useful in increasing take-up
(Banerjee et al., 2013).
As loans come with liability, not everyone, particularly those who are not keen
on expanding a business, are willing to take it. In a study with Tanzanian
microentrepreneurs, Berge et al. (2015) find no effect on investment by giving them
substantial grants. It is because these small businesses are more often constrained in
consumption than in production, and therefore, using the money for consumption
purposes is more optimal. On another note, often some microentrepreneurs who
could otherwise make profits from the expansion of their existing businesses, have 
a job or housework which creates frictions for business expansion. Under such
circumstances, they might invest if they get a grant but are unwilling to borrow and
pay interest in order to invest (Banerjee, 2013). Risk-motivated voluntary 
withdrawal from the credit market (in other words, “risk-rationing”) (Binswanger
and Sillers, 1983; Giné and Yang, 2009) is also one of the reasons that uninsured
borrowers are deterred from taking loans. It is the risk of high default costs when
they are unable to repay, which discourages them. These findings starkly uncover
the fact that the borrower’s concerns often lie far away from the offered loans. To 
make things worse, most often these loans are offered with strict purposes, e.g. to be
invested in business only, which further inhibits take-up. The above examples
identify that these targeted potential borrowers are actually often devoid of the
abilities to run a business successfully.
Low take-up of microloans also points out that they may not be tailored as per the
client’s needs and preferences. The welfare gains from taking a microcredit loan
are subjective. Therefore, it is plausible that the take-up rate could be improved if
we consider a potential borrower’s risk preferences as well as other preferences
15
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discussed in the behavioural science literature. For example, a risk-taking and
dynamic individual may prefer not to get involved with a group (e.g. so as not to 
have to waste time monitoring neighbours) (Banerjee, 2013). This argument
indicates that having different contract structures with different criteria of risk and
repayment could attract borrowers of heterogeneous preferences. Evidence shows
that a strict repayment schedule can discourage illiquid and risky investment (Field
et al., 2013) or repel high-revenue borrowers (Barboni, 2017). Such findings prove
that a grace period or a variable repayment schedule helps increasing take-up by
borrowers with diverse business interests.
While varying certain features of the loan contracts has proven to have a positive
effect on take-up rate, in doing so, risk preferences are found to be vital in
determining the type of loan chosen. For example, Attanasio et al. (2018) find that
subjective risk perceptions on the expected profit affect the demand for loans. They
further find that a joint liability loan is preferred over an individual liability one as it 
encourages risk-sharing among members and reduces the risk involved in any project
(particularly, for new business starters). Furthermore, Bertrand et al. (2010) find 
evidence from South African credit markets that framing has a substantial effect on
the take-up of loans. For example, having a dominated alternative in the choice-set
can drive take-up of the dominating one. Moreover, framing in terms of loss can have 
a more significant impact on take-up than comparable gain frames (à la Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)). Finally, time preferences also drive take-up, e.g. individuals
with hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997) are more prone to take up microcredit,
as difficulty in saving today makes them credit-constrained in future (Bauer et al.,
2012). These results summarise that loans need to be personalised according to the
preferences of borrowers, and that could be a way of increasing take-up.
All the channels discussed above broadly point out that the lack of take-up can
be substantially addressed if the information gap between the lender’soffer and the
borrower’s interests is minimised. Given the intricacies in demand from the
borrower’s point of view, actively studying take-up with rigorous research designs
can provide more definitive answers and help understand how to design better
contracts that attract more clients and serve them better. Designs that are more
efficient would not only help in having diverse borrowers successfully using their
contract types, but also be more profitable for the lenders in terms of spreading
their risks over default. In the first essay of this dissertation, I explore how changes
in the loan offerings can affect take-up due to the heterogeneity in preferences of
borrowers.
In the following subsections, I shift the focus on the topic of health. The
following subsection sketches the health status of the poor in developing countries
and their approach to healthcare. Then follows a discussion on the insights provided 
by the existing literature on healthcare utilisation by the poor in these countries.
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Introduction
1.2.3 Health
The brunt of infectious diseases is enormous in developing countries. In 2018,
there were an estimated 228 million cases of malaria worldwide, with Africa being 
home to 93% of the cases. An estimated 49.8 million DALYs7 occurred from
diarrhoeal diseases in 2016, equivalent to 60% of all diarrhoeal deaths, again the
developing countries being the major contributors of the statistics.8 Many of these
infectious diseases can be averted by simple and cost-effective investments, e.g.
using insecticide-treated bed nets, chlorinating drinking water. While these poor
statistics suggest that there is room for tremendous improvement through
preventive healthcare technologies, they simultaneously point out how
disproportionately high the economic and social impact of these deadly diseases
would be if not prevented earlier.
According to the revealed preference interpretation of the human capital theory
(Grossman, 2000), a consumer will invest in health if the expected discounted
private benefit, including the utility benefit, is higher than the cost, both financial
and in utility terms. Therefore, not investing in healthy practices – such as
vaccinating the child or chlorinating water, reflects the disutility from preventive
actions, or high discount rates (due to present bias, or high expected mortality
rates), or merely low valuation of life (Kremer and Glennerster, 2011). Empirical
evidence from developing countries portrays two distinctly stylised facts in the
health behaviour of poor households. First, they spend enormous amounts in
curative healthcare, and second, they do not spend enough on preventive
healthcare (Dupas, 2011b). It is only logical that the second stylised fact is a 
precursor of the first. Although in theory, it is easier to address preventive
healthcare investment with an affordable solution, it is puzzling as to why it does not
happen in reality for the poor. As a result, recent empirical literature is more
focussed in its investigation of preventive healthcare behaviour.
In the following subsection, I focus mostly on the literature that concerns take-
up or optimal utilisation of preventive healthcare, which inspires the second and third 
essays of this dissertation by a large extent.
7 DALY, i.e. Disability-Adjusted Life Year is a metric in health statistics. DALYs for a
disease or health condition are calculated as the sum of the Years of Life Lost (YLL) 
due to premature mortality in the population and the Years Lost due to Disability
(YLD) for people living with a health condition or its consequences. For example, one
DALY can be thought of as one lost year of “healthy” life.
8 Source: World Health Organization
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1.2.4 Why the low take-up of preventive healthcare?
The studies interested in the low adoption of preventive healthcare in developing
countries have explored several channels through which the take-up of a range of
low-cost public health products (e.g. mosquito nets, vaccinations, chlorine
treatment, deworming) could be increased. In those studies, some distinct channels
stand out. These channels can be broadly categorised as follows: (a) lack of
information, (b) financial constraints, and (c) non-standard (behavioural) channels.
The first factor that affects take-up is information. Information related to
individual and local risk factors has been useful in changing health behaviour. For
example, informing households that their well water is concentrated in arsenic, can
increase the chances that they move to a safer water source (Madajewicz et al., 
2007; Bennear et al., 2013), or that their drinking water is contaminated with faecal
bacteria can affect their adoption of purification techniques (Jalan and Somanathan,
2008). Similarly, informing adolescent girls on the risks of contracting HIV can
change their sexual behaviour (Dupas, 2011a). Social learning (or, the spread of
information through peers and neighbours) have also shown a positive impact on
take-up behaviour. In particular, when health behaviour comes at a cost (a costly
tool or technology), individuals prefer to first know from their peers about the
higher returns and then invest themselves. For example, Oster and Thornton (2011)
find evidence from Nepal, that having more friends who also received personal
hygiene products for free, increased the likelihood of self-adoption of the product
by adolescent girls. In a similar example, Dupas (2014) finds from a randomised 
experiment in Kenya that the individuals exposed to earlier adopters of anti-
malarial bed nets, showed a higher inclination in adopting them.
The second factor to the low take-up of health-improving technologies is the
financial barrier. In that, the imperfect financial market and subsequent liquidity
constraints play a significant contributing role. Often investing in a new water
purification technology or an insecticide-treated bed net would require lumpy 
investments, which the low-income households cannot always necessarily afford.
Therefore, access to credit or safe saving technology is crucial for disciplining
preventive health behaviour. This credit constraint becomes prominent through the
findings that the take-up of preventive tools increases if the poor are allowed time to
accumulate funds (Dupas, 2009), or given cash before they are offered the
product/technology (Hoffmann et al., 2009), or allowed to use microfinance loans 
to get those (Tarozzi et al., 2014).
In a similar vein, households that do not have access to credit through
borrowing, should still be able to save to acquire these technologies. However, due
to the presence of imperfect financial markets, poor households cannot afford 
reliable saving technologies, which in turn never takes them out of the poverty
trap. Dupas and Robinson (2013b) find evidence that individuals would invest more
18
 
 
     
        
    
    
    
   
   
  
      
       
        
         
  
          
  
     
  
    
          
            
  
 
     
              
     
          
           
               
   
    
     
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
Introduction
in health if they had access to better saving technology. Finally, the fact that they
respond positively to monetary (or even non-monetary) incentives also bears 
testimony to the fact that they are liquidity constrained.
The final contributing factors, which have also proven to drive take-up, can be
explained only through the channel of specific models based in behavioural theory. 
In the standard economic model, individuals discount the future at a constant rate.
However, in the behavioural paradigm, even though individuals would like to adopt
healthy behaviour in the future, they may not yet want to sacrifice any
pleasure/resources today (Laibson, 1997). This theory could explain a similar
procrastinating behaviour while taking up preventive healthcare. While the use of
commitment devices can help individuals save up for something, sometimes small
nudges or incentives can also help them change this procrastinating behaviour
(Dupas and Robinson, 2013b; Tarozzi et al., 2014).
Some other behavioural theories have found empirical validation in this area.
For example, that take-up rises right after a promotion campaign and then subsides 
over time, is borrowed from the limited attention model. Kremer et al. (2011b) find
some validation of this model in their study on the distribution of dilute chlorine
solution to mothers in Kenya. Banerjee et al. (2011) find evidence in a similar vein,
in a study on the use of fortified flour in India. Furthermore, Hoffmann et al. (2009)
find validation of the endowment effect through their finding that individuals put
more value to a product that they directly receive than obtaining enough money to
buy it. Here, on a slightly different note, one could expect that after getting the
products for free for some time, individuals might not be willing to pay to buy them
next time. This argument is based on the price anchoring effect in the behavioural
literature. However, no adverse effect of price anchoring has been found in the
related empirical literature, and individuals still show interest in investing in those
health technologies after receiving them for free in the past. In this case, learning 
proves to be a more vital channel of effect (Kremer et al., 2011b; Dupas, 2014).
The studies mentioned above, have applied reliable and rigorous methodologies
(mostly, randomised controlled trials) in order to explore the importance of the
fundamental channels that can substantially affect adoption of preventive
healthcare measures. Many of the factors highlighted here have been recognised to
be overcome by direct nudges and incentives to poor beneficiaries. These are
endeavours to improve demand from the poor. Nonetheless, there are also supply-
side drawbacks that can lead to sub-optimal take-ups, such as failed infrastructure
and management. In those situations, it is imperative to incentivise the supply
providers. The second essay of this dissertation delves into some challenges on the
demand-side, and the third essay also highlights a supply-side challenge alongside
demand.
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2 Overview of the Essays
In this section, I present the summaries of the three essays that constitute this
dissertation. While discussing the essays in detail, I highlight the empirical
methods used, the findings, and finally, underline their main contributions to the
scientific literature.
2.1 Take-up of joint and individual liability loans:
An analysis with laboratory experiment
This essay draws its primary motivation from the consistent finding of low take-up 
of microcredit in earlier literature (Banerjee et al., 2015b). The central argument of
this work is that loan selection happens from the borrower-side and thus can be
affected by her preferences. Therefore, in this study, I focus on borrowers’
heterogeneity in preferences and thereby try to understand if allowing borrowers to
self-select into their desired loan-type is a way of increasing take-up.9 In a
laboratory microfinance experiment, I test whether the take-up rate increases when
borrowers are offered a flexible choice-set with both joint liability (JL) and
individual liability (IL) loans, in contrast to an offer of one loan-type only. This
set-up is distinctly different from previous experiments (in lab or field) with
microcredit loans where the borrowers were unable to choose between different
loan-types (Giné and Karlan, 2014; Banerjee et al., 2015b).
I argue that certain features of JL and IL loan-types could be advantageous or
disadvantageous to borrowers according to their preferences. One of the main
features of these loans is the dynamic incentive, i.e. the promise of further loans
9 One might argue that it is not necessarily surprising in itself that offering more loan
options in the choice-set would increase the take-up rate. However, a growing body of
literature on cognitive load in psychology confirms that an increased number of
choices can often impair optimal decision-making (Iyenger and Lepper, 2000;
Schwartz, 2004). Especially in this study’s context, when the prospective borrowers
have to choose between profit-making loan options, they might end up making poor
and irrational choices, possibly be even discouraged to take any loan at all. In light of
this, it is worth checking whether my hypothesis of an increased take-up rate holds for
an elaborate choice-set.
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Overview of the Essays
from the lender in case of full repayment. With this feature, JL excels over IL
because the former ensures a higher probability of repayment through a jointly
liable peer-group, which in turn increases the chances of getting more loans in
future. Joint liability thus reduces the risk of non-repayment after every period of a
loan. Therefore, a borrower who is risk-averse regarding repayment would prefer
this loan-type.
On the other hand, as the future time horizon for the availability of future loans
(through dynamic incentive) is unknown, the discount factor of the borrower is
likely to drive her choice. The borrower, who discounts the future less and values
the long-run benefit of receiving further loans, would have a higher willingness to
take up JL loan. However, for the borrower who discounts the future heavily, the
short-run cost of repaying on behalf of an unsuccessful partner might surpass the
fruits of receiving more loans with higher chances in the long run; this would make
her prefer individual liability. Therefore, given these features, the ex-ante
optimisation by borrowers should be influenced by their risk preferences and
discount factors.
In addition to that, the taker of JL could also be willing to bear the cost of a
partner’s burden because she enjoys higher utility from not only her own the 
expected gains but also her partner’s. This possibility originates from the
behavioural foundations of preferences which validate that it is not uncommon for
an individual to derive additional (positive/negative) utility from other’s outcome, 
i.e. social or other-regarding preferences (Levine, 1998). To sum up, the possible
differences in risk, discounting and other-regarding preferences incite my
hypothesis that when the choice-set of loan-types is constricted, there might not be
as many takers as would be with a flexible choice-set.
First, I sketch a theoretical model that includes parameters for risk, time
discounting and other-regarding preferences, to analyse the borrower’s decision-
making when offered a choice of the two loan-types for investment in a business. I
keep the model parsimonious to allow the least possible confoundments. The JL
structure is designed for a two-person group, with information symmetry between
each other; all other features on loan size, interest rate and business risk are kept
the same across the two loan-types. Furthermore, in a JL loan, each member gets a
loan for herself and can invest in her own business; it is only the repayment where
they are “jointly liable”, i.e. if one cannot repay, the other has to repay on behalf of
the former. The repayment ability is determined by the sole success in business
investment of the IL loan borrower, and at least one successful business investment
of the group that borrows JL loan. Inability to repay by herself (with IL) or as a
group (with JL) indicates the availability of no future loans. To summarise, the 
fundamental structure of the model is in line with the previous theoretical literature
(Armendáriz de Aghion, 1999). Additionally, I introduce an “outside option” for
21
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the non-takers, by designing an employment opportunity (EMPL) which has lesser
risk and lesser return compared to what a successful business investment has.
The experiment was conducted with 220 university student subjects in the
decision-making lab in Turku, Finland. Three treatment variations were
implemented - one group was offered a choice-set of IL, JL and EMPL, another
group was offered a choice-set of IL and EMPL, and the last group was offered a
choice-set of JL and EMPL. Comparison of the first group with the other two
groups helps evaluate whether the flexibility of being able to self-select from a 
bigger choice-set increases overall take-up or not. I further elicited each subject’s
risk, social and time preferences through auxiliary choice tasks.
I find statistically significant evidence in favour of my hypothesis that when
offered a choice-set with the two loan-types, the take-up proportion is higher than 
an offer of just one type. With respect to IL-JL-EMPL, take-up was lower by 15.99
percentage points (p = 0.033) in IL-EMPL and by 13.42 percentage points (p = 
0.072) in JL-EMPL. These are equivalent to 20% and 17% lower take-ups than in
the flexible choice-set with both loans. I also find interesting effects of
heterogeneous preferences, thus confirming their association with the choice-
making by the borrower. The willingness to take up IL loan decreases with risk
aversion; but in general, the willingness to take up any loan decreases with risk
aversion. By testing the association between altruism and the chosen loan-type, I
find that subjects choosing JL also donated more in a one-shot dictator game.10 
Finally, the findings on heterogeneous preferences validate my theoretical
predictions through a reduced-form analysis.
To my knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to have aimed to examine 
the intertwined channels of different types of preferences that could affect take-up 
of microloans. To see whether at all multiple preferences are in action, only a
controlled experimental set-up in a laboratory could help. Although this
methodology implies a trade-off with external validity by not having the natural
set-up with a contextual sample, this study’s scientific contribution is adequately
vital in the empirical literature of microcredit. Firstly, it contributes to the literature
of low take-up through the channel of strict contract structures (or, lack of demand-
driven loan structures). The finding that a flexible choice-set can increase take-up 
rate bears validation to that. Secondly, I prove that risk and time preferences matter
in the take-up of different loan-types, and thus contribute to the growing literature
The dictator game represents a workhorse in experimental economics to assess how
individuals respond to situations where self-interest and equality are opposed to each
other (Kahneman et al., 1986). It provides insights into the social preferences of
individuals. It could be ‘one-shot’ or with repetitive rounds, depending on what sort
of social preferences we want to learn, altruism or reciprocity.
10
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on how the take-up of loan-types varies with preferences (Barboni, 2017; Attanasio
et al., 2018; Ahlin et al., 2020). I also establish that often controlled lab 
experiments can successfully provide insights into how to effectively design
complex policies that are hard to understand in field experiments due to various
confounding factors. Finally, one side-contribution of this study is the detailed
sample size and power calculation. It is a crucial yet often unpublished part of
experiments, which tremendously helps in replication studies.
In essence, the outcome of this study suggests that based on borrowers’
preferences, both loan-types would be valuable to offer. Nevertheless, it is
important to reflect a little on how these findings fit the current scenario on
microfinance loans across the world. Although my study, along with the related 
new line of literature, brings out the nuances of various contract structures and
how those can primarily drive the take-up rate and welfare of the borrowers,
there has been a prominent downward trend in the use of joint liability 
microloans, in general. This trend has mostly to do with the lender’s digression in
interest in joint liability since the early years of microfinance. With the flourish
of the microfinance industry, growing commercialisation among the lending 
organisations has led to this shift in interest from JL loan to IL loan (Cull et al., 
2009; De Quidt et al., 2018).11 Ahlin and Suandi (2019), on the other hand,
explain that joint liability works in situations where overcoming obstacles in
lending, e.g. information asymmetry is problematic. According to them, this
phasing out of joint liability structure is the result of an evolution of the best
practices in lending, and joint liability structure being superseded by other
lending innovations that are fit for a changing lending environment. With the
repeated practice of lending, institutions have become experienced in overcoming
the impediments like information asymmetries, enforcement limitations and weak
social capital. Thus, they have shifted away from group lending with joint
liability. Nevertheless, the authors agree that the JL structure could still be an
efficient tool for new lending organisations, or even old ones venturing into new
areas fraught with information asymmetries and limitations, as it was in the
movement’s early decades. This view by Ahlin and Suandi (2019) offers a
In a formal analysis, with data from MIXMarket for 2008-2014, De Quidt et al.
(2018) show that  the shift from non-profit to for-profit organisations, along with
rising competition all over the world, has led to this current status. A for-profit
organisation essentially targets a different objective function than a non-profit one.
The authors further argue that joint liability contracts, in general, maximise
borrower’s welfare, so non-profits offer JL contracts whenever they can break even
while doing so. On the other hand, for-profits require not only to breakeven but also
more profitability than IL. It is a strict condition, and hence the latter often end up
offering a few JL contracts only.
11 
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positive aspect that research on different loan structures, including the joint
liability type, still has something to offer. 
On a more serious note, some critical incidents resulting from the shift in focus
from non-profit to for-profit nature of organisations over the past years have left
policy-makers worried about the welfare consequences of microcredit loans. For
example, in India, the unregulated growth of for-profit lending organisations under
the umbrella of the flourishing microfinance industry, along with coercive loan-
recovery practices, resulted in suicides by hundreds of debt-trapped poor farmers at
the end of the last decade. Such usurious practices resulting from the profit-driven
nature of lenders defeat the supposed purpose of microcredit of improving the lives
of the poor. While these outcomes suggest extreme caution in the use of
microcredit loans as welfare products, they also usher in need for innovation in 
cash policies or alternative ways of financial inclusion of the poor.12 
2.2 Is household shock a boon or bane to the 
utilisation of preventive healthcare for children?
Evidence from Uganda
This essay is motivated by the second stylised fact in the health behaviour of the
poor in low-income households, as highlighted earlier in Section 1.2.3. In this
study using secondary panel survey data on Ugandan households, I investigate
how their preventive healthcare behaviour changes in times of health and income
shocks. First, I aim to understand if the take-up of preventive healthcare varies 
with the type of shock suffered, be it health or income-related. (Note that, by 
‘shock’ I mean a negative shock that causes a decrease in the current level of
health or income.) Second, I explore the channels through which the shocks
affect take-up.
The hypothesis that take-up of preventive healthcare may react differently to a
health shock vis-à-vis an income shock is driven by various economic as well as 
behavioural theories. For example, Grossman’s model recognises that the demand 
12 For instance, Dupas and Robinson (2013a) already find evidence from rural Kenya
that helping the poor in opening non-interest-bearing bank accounts improved their
savings and then increased their productive investments. Quite interestingly, Dupas
and Robinson (2013a) already point out the efficiency of such an intervention over
loans; almost 87% of people took up the offered savings account, while less than three
per cent of individuals initiated a loan application even after receiving assistance with
the collateral requirement as found in another related study.
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Overview of the Essays
for healthcare is a derived demand, from the demand for health.13 This means that
households with reduced health stock will gain higher marginal utility from health,
and hence utilise preventive healthcare more. On the other hand, an increase in 
preventive healthcare investment could also be related to salience after a health
shock (Kahneman and Thaler, 2006; Seymour et al., 2007). Perhaps one could even
argue through simple economies of scale approach that while visiting the health
centre to get remedial care for the health shock, the additional cost of receiving 
some preventive healthcare alongside, is relatively low. All these well-founded 
theories indicate that a health shock could increase the take-up of preventive
healthcare. On the contrary, an income shock could be expected to have a
substantial income effect on credit-constrained households and subsequently reduce
investment in preventive healthcare.
To test this hypothesis, I take the context of Ugandan households and their
take-up behaviour of immunisation for their children. When it comes to preventive
healthcare for small children, the best outcome variables to discuss are those
related to immunisation. To give some perspective to the general healthcare
condition in Uganda, the country holds a rank of 158/189 in the Human
Development Index.14 
The Ministry of Health recognises that 75% of the disease burden could be
averted by immunisation, hygiene and sanitation, nutrition and other preventive
healthcare practices. The Ugandan National Expanded Programme on Immunisation
has been functional for over four decades with a goal that every Ugandan child
should be fully vaccinated. Moreover, since 2001, the Ugandan National Minimum
Healthcare Package entitles every Ugandan a free basic healthcare coverage at
public healthcare facilities. Despite the availability of these programmes, the
outcomes on child health have not beenpromising. In 2011, only 52% of children
aged 12-23 months were fully immunised and only 40% of children aged 12-23 
months were immunised before their first birthday.15 According to the Uganda
Demographic and Health Survey (2011), the rate of Vitamin A deficiency, which 
13 Michael Grossman’s 1972 model is a seminal work in health economics. The model
views each individual as both a producer and a consumer of health. Individuals inherit
a stock of health that depreciates over time and can be augmented with investments;
thus, health is viewed as a sort of capital. The model further acknowledges that
improved health has both consumption and investment qualities. As a consumption, it
makes us feel better. As an investment, it provides the opportunity to work more
hours, more years until retirement, or more productively, either in the market or at
home (Grossman, 1972).
14 Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2018
15 Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012
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can threaten overall immunity and cause blindness, was as high as 33% among 
children under five, despite the availability of immunisation doses.
Using four waves of panel data (2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2013-
2014) from the Uganda Nation Panel Survey, I study 1500 nationally and regionally 
representative households and their response to preventive healthcare for their
children in times of shocks. As the outcome variable on immunisation (or, 
preventive healthcare), I use the receipt of Vitamin A Supplementation (henceforth,
VAS) by children.16 I further use the incidence of flood or drought as the proxy for
an income shock,17 and illness of any household member as the indicator of a health 
shock.
I resort to a household fixed effects regression analysis to control for a number of
observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics of the household that
could potentially affect the shock incidence as well as the VAS intake by eligible
children in the household. A fixed-effects analysis at household level absorbs all
the across-household variations and compares children of the same household. 
Alongside, the effect of idiosyncratic risk is investigated, and while doing so, the
time-invariant household risk factors are removed. Finally, the additional use of
survey wave fixed effects allows controlling for heterogeneity arising across the
survey waves. Besides using several individual-specific covariates in the model, I
further examine less-parsimonious versions of the model where I control for time-
varying health supply-related variables as well as geographical locations and
distances to other amenities, that could confound the effect.
Main results show that the probability of taking a child to get VAS increases by
14 percentage points if an adverse health shock hits the household. Similarly, a 
negative income shock increases the probability of VAS intake by about nine
percentage points. Given an overall sample mean of 73% VAS intake, these 
increases are 19.7% due to a health shock and 12.9% due to an income shock.
However, these findings are statistically significant only at 10% in almost all
model-variants; therefore, further research in similar settings is required in order to 
draw a strong conclusion.
In the Ugandan context, no direct cost is incurred by the households in getting
their children immunised; however, they could face indirect costs (e.g. from
transportation to healthcare facilities) and/or opportunity cost of time which they 
16 The Ugandan Health Ministry and UNICEF strictly recommend that all caretakers of
children between 6-59 months should take them to healthcare facilities to receive
VAS every six months, as a part of their immunisation schedule.
17 More than 50% of the households in the sample have agriculture as their primary
source of income. Therefore, flood and drought are central in determining their
income shock.
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spend in accessing healthcare services. In the event of a health shock, the latter cost
(in other words, time spent away from labour market activities) seems to drive my 
primary findings. Evidence shows that a typical member of a household hit by a
health shock spends significantly less time in labour market activities than one in a
shock-free household. Thus, it could mean that the inability to be at work due to
illness reduces the opportunity cost of this ‘forced’ time away from the labour
market, which is then used for remedial care and other health-promoting activities
for their children. It indeed hints to the economies of scale argument, that the
additional cost of getting preventive healthcare for children is low when they 
already visit the healthcare facility for remedial purposes.
In case of an income shock, it is not easy to pin down the underlying
mechanism. The study is able to confirm a positive average effect of the adverse 
income shock on time spent in the labour market. However, I further find a
confirmation that a relatively wealthy household spends lesser time on average in
labour activities during the shock. Such an increase in leisure hours is justified, if
the household draws down assets, or borrows credit, or receives transfers to insure 
away the negative income shock, and also, finds it cheaper to substitute time away
from the labour market.18 With the limitation of being able to confirm this channel
directly, the study only suggests that the positive effect found on the intake of VAS
could be driven by the wealthier households substituting preventive healthcare
activities for labour (as their opportunity cost of time away from work decreases).
Essentially, shocks are a way of identifying the ex-ante constraints in resources
of the household. In Section 1.2.4, mostly the issue of liquidity constraints came
up, while discussing the financial barriers to the adoption of preventive healthcare
practices. However, this study points out yet another financial barrier. It is the
opportunity cost of time spent on accessing health services instead of being spent
on income-generating activities. Therefore, this study identifies that low take-up 
due to high demand on time could also be categorised under the financial constraint
challenges in the adoption of preventive healthcare for poor households.19 In a 
slightly different vein, several other studies with low-income households have 
highlighted that it is the distance to availing the healthcare technologies which
negatively affects the take-up (Banerjee et al., 2010; Banerjee et al., 2011; Kremer 
et al., 2011a). I believe that while transportation in itself could impose a cost, the
opportunity cost of time could also be valid in explaining their findings. In this
regard, the findings of this study give a different perspective on those results.
18 For example, previous literature already highlights that households offset transitory
income shocks by using asset-holdings (either as buffer or as collateral for credit)
(Deaton, 1992; Beegle et al., 2006).
19 Previously, Miller and Urdinola (2010) have found similar results in Columbia.
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Since health investment is costly as individuals must trade off time and other
resources related to health, it affects the optimal demand for health. Thus I add to
the literature that acknowledges that time is a crucial health input (Grossman, 1972;
Gronau, 1977; Vistnes and Hamilton, 1995; Miller and Urdinola, 2010). Finally,
from the finding that the adults in low-income households engage more in 
preventive healthcare activities for their children when the opportunity cost of being
away from work is low, we could also interpret that it is not in their primary 
interest. Therefore, concerning policy contribution, either price subsidies to offset
the opportunity cost of accessing healthcare or strict mandates on healthcare 
practices is necessary.
2.3 Cash incentives to mothers or to community 
health workers – what contributes better to the
health of the mother and the newborn? 
Evidence from India
While financial constraint is one of the primary reasons for low take-up of
preventive healthcare practices in low-income households, monetary (and, also
non-monetary) incentives provide some relaxation to that constraint. Conditional
Cash Transfers (henceforth, CCTs) could be an effective solution. In CCT, a
lumpsum monetary incentive generates a short-run income effect. On the other
hand, the conditionality of it in adopting good behaviour in health or education can
positively affect the well-being, and possibly break the cycle of poverty, in the long
run.20 This essay explores such a health-related CCT in India, the Janani Suraksha
Yojana (“Safe Motherhood Programme"). In this programme, mothers received 
cash benefits conditional on giving birth at public healthcare facilities. This
incentive was to improve the demand-side challenges in maternal and neonatal
healthcare in India. However, the main thrust of the programme lay in that it also
recognised the supply-side challenges. To address the supply-side inefficiencies,
the programme incentivised community health workers to improve health service
20 While microcredit has been controversial as a credit welfare programme, CCT is
relatively more successful. CCTs started in Latin America, and by the ’90s every
country there was running its cash transfer programme. PROGRESA in Mexico is the
most significant example, which started with approximately 300,000 beneficiary
households in 1997 and then spread across almost 5 million households after a decade
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). CCT is better and less strict than microcredit loans in the sense
that it does not expect everyone to be an entrepreneur and run successful businesses,
but gives the money without any repayment liability. However, it does expect the 
households to send children to school or get them immunised, which is naturally
easier.
28
 
 
 
   
  
   
 
    
   
            
          
  
       
        
   
            
   
 
 
      
     
  
      
      
        
     
             
          
  
  
 
    
   
  
       
            
 
  
           
   
Overview of the Essays
delivery to the beneficiary mothers. In this essay, I disentangle several intricacies
in the programme eligibility and attempt to shed light on the effective channels that
induce good health practices among new mothers, for themselves and their
newborns. For that purpose, I use data from secondary surveys on mothers with
newborns around the programme’s timeline and implement a difference-in-
difference identification strategy.
In the early ’90s India, maternal mortality ratio (MMR) per 100,000 live births
was 556 which accounted for almost 19.7% of deaths of women in their
reproductive age due to issues related to pregnancy (in absolute terms, this number
was as high as 152,000 maternal deaths). In addition to this, the neonatal mortality
ratio (NMR) per 1000 live births was 57.4. A decade later, MMR had reduced to
374, which was equivalent to 13% of women’s deaths due to maternity, and NMR
was still 45.1. Between years 2001-2005, while 48.5% expecting mothers received
the three WHO-recommended antenatal care check-ups, only 7.3% Indian women
gave birth in the presence of any trained health professional, almost 3% did not give
birth at a health facility due to lack of transportation. Only 10% of the new mothers 
received a postnatal visit by the health worker within two weeks of giving birth. In 
order to tackle this dire status of maternal and child health, the Government of
India introduced this nationwide reform. The JSY programme took effect from
April 2005. Its objective was to promote institutional delivery among poor
pregnant women. Simultaneously, incentives were offered to village-based health
workers, known as the Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs), to act as an
immediate link between the beneficiary mothers and the public health system. The
ASHA’s primary duties lay in helping expecting mothers in the community with
antenatal care, birth and postnatal care.
In its initial years of implementation, the programme underwent a few rounds of
revision in terms of the mother’s eligibility for the cash assistance and the ASHA’s
employment across states. However, broadly, eligible mothers for cash assistance 
were particularly the socio-economically disadvantaged ones. The JSY scheme
divided the states into the high-focus and non-high focus ones, which were 
officially termed as the low-performing states (LPS) and high- performing states
(HPS). The ASHAs were only employed in the LPS in the initial few years. I use a 
difference-in-difference identification strategy, where I incorporate variations
across the eligibility of mothers and the presence of ASHAs, to distinctly identify
the causal effects along the channel of the mother’s incentive vis-à-vis the ASHA’s
incentive.
For empirical analysis, I use repeated cross-sections from the District Level
Household Survey of India, which gives a sample of over 300,000 mothers. The
survey provides detailed information on antenatal care, delivery (including details 
of receipt of JSY cash assistance) and postnatal care of the mother’s most recent
29
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birth during 2001-2008. Additionally, the survey contains information on the
demographic composition and socio-economic characteristics of her household -
including caste, religion, and wealth status.
Primary results of this study show that the mothers receiving both cash transfer
and ASHA’s counselling outperformed the mothers receiving only cash transfer, in
outcomes like giving birth at public health facilities and early breastfeeding. To put
the difference in perspective, an eligible mother in the high-performing state 
experienced 2.9 percentage points greater increase in institutional births than the
ineligible mother. In contrast, for an eligible mother in a low-performing state, this
increase in the difference with the ineligible mother was 7.1 percentage points.
These are equivalent to changes of about 11% and 28% in institutional birth rates
compared to what an ineligible mother experienced in the pre-intervention period.
A similar impact is found for antenatal care and BCG vaccination for the child too.
For the rural mothers with up to two births, the ASHA’s channel is found to be
distinctly more effective for all outcomes. However, the overall implication is that
only receiving a cash transfer for giving birth at a public health facility might not be
sufficient for a mother to get motivated or to overcome the costs. Continual
guidance pre and post-birth by the health worker would lead to better all-round
health of the mother and the newborn.
To summarise, this essay investigates a unique quasi-experimental cash transfer
policy that recognises both demand-side and supply-side challenges to optimal
utilisation of healthcare by the poor. The existing literature consists of studies 
separately looking at demand-side issues and supply-side issues, and they prove
that there are obstacles to take-up on both sides.21 The other big social welfare
programmes in the format of CCT have mostly catered to the demand-side issues 
(e.g. PROGRESA in Mexico, Bolsa Família in Brazil). However, then, it is hard to
truly understand the effectiveness of the programme if we cannot see how functional
the supply-side has been. For example, in several African countries, where the health
service delivery system suffers from a severe lack of organisation and management,
CCTs to low-income families would not be effective at all (WHO, 2007). Now, in
such a situation, experimental set-ups, such as randomised controlled trials, can give
better freedom to the researcher in simulating an environment in which the supply-
side can also be controlled. For example, Banerjee et al. (2010) implemented a
While the entire Section 1.2.4 is dedicated to studies on demand-side barriers to take-
up of healthcare, a body of literature also confirms the supply-side obstacles. For
example, issues such as inadequacy of medical equipment in healthcare facilities,
absenteeism of health professionals are prevalent in developing countries. In addition,
the rate of usage of public healthcare is strongly correlated with absenteeism of health
professionals from health facilities (Banerjee et al., 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).
21 
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randomised experiment in rural India to investigate both demand and supply-side
issues of child immunisation. They set up immunisation camps in one group of
villages (as supply incentive), and they provided food incentives to parents besides
setting up immunisation camps in another group (as supply and demand
incentives). Then they compared the mean outcomes in the two groups with a
control group of villages with no incentive. However, though randomised controlled
trials as by Banerjee et alia provide the advantage of design and rigour, they are often
small-scale and hence, limited in external validity. In that regard, the quasi-
experimental nature of the study in this essay gives the most robust external
validation possible.22 Moreover, in terms of findings, this study offers an
improvement over the other impact evaluations of the JSY programme through its
rigorous inspection of the two distinct channels of effect, namely the mother’s
incentive vs the ASHA’s incentive.23 
Furthermore, in terms of the channels that affect take-up in the first place, this
study underlines the prevalence of financial constraints to the new mother (and her
family) which often puts a barrier to the access of better healthcare and health-
promoting practices. These costs could arise due to travelling across long distances
in order to avail proper healthcare, or through the opportunity cost due to lost
wages of the family members who have to help the mother during her pregnancy. 
Here, we see an example of a direct monetary incentive to the mother, which can
redeem this financial barrier. Finally, the positive impact through the ASHA’s
counselling also ascertains that information on the importance of health and 
healthcare can bridge the gap to low use of healthcare. Not only that, but it also 
points out that the problem of low take-up arising through the channel of lack of
information, can be addressed by active engagement (and incentivisation) of the
supply-side. Particularly in this design, the information channel through the ASHA
happens to be stronger than the relaxation of the financial constraint channel
through cash assistance to the mother.
22 I acknowledge that quasi-experiments are inferior to randomised experiments in terms
of internal validity (due to the lack of random assignment), but then again identification
strategies like difference-in-difference are used essentially to bypass the problems 
arising from non-randomisation.
23 Thus, it complements nascent literature on the JSY programme that examines the two 
channels of incentives (e.g. (Debnath, 2018)).
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